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NOTE
WORKFARE WAGES UNDER
THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT
Walter M. Luers
INTRODUCTION
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 19961 ("PRA") fundamentally changed public assistance. Most
importantly, the PRA imposed mandatory work requirements upon
welfare recipients.' Consequently, state legislatures designed legisla-
tion to comply -with the PRA's novel requirements.3 The PRA also
replaced federal welfare entitlement spending.4 Prior to the enact-
ment of the PRA, states received money on par with the size of their
welfare rolls.5 The PRA allocates block grants to the states6 and fixes
these amounts at prescribed levels.7 The states must maintain defined
rates of work program participation among their welfare population
to maintain federal funding levels for their public assistance pro-
grams.' Under the PRA, welfare recipients began, for the first time
on a broad scale, working to receive their benefits.9
1. Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 7, 8, 21, 25, 42 U.S.C.).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. 111996).
3. See id. § 602(a). Some states have proposed or implemented experimental
welfare plans pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (1994). See Recent Welfare Waiver Applica-
tions and Approvals, 30 Clearinghouse Rev. 463-70 (1996) (listing approved state
plans); Recent Welfare Waiver Applications and Approvals, 29 Clearinghouse Rev.
580-84 (1995) (same).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (Supp. 111996).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a) (1994), repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat.
2105, 2112.
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(1)(A) (Supp. 111996).
7. The block grants of each state are determined through formulae that utilize
prior fiscal spending. See id § 603(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).
8. See id § 607(b).
9. The work requirements are mandatory. See id. § 607. Everyone who receives
welfare, over 10 million people at the time of passage, falls within the scope of the act.
See Administration for Children and Families, Aid to Families with Dependent Chit-
dren Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 1960-1997 (last modified May 27, 1998)
<http://www.acf.dhhs.govlnews/6097rf.htm> (listing the number of recipients of wel-
fare in 1996). "Workfare" is not of recent vintage. The prior welfare law had created
the job opportunities and basic skills training program, or -JOBS." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(19) (1994), repealed by Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112; see also
Matthew Diller, Working Without a Job: The Social Messages of the New Workfare, 9
Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 19, 20-25 (1998) (tracing the development of federal work re-
quirements under the Family Support Act ("FSA"), the PRA's predecessor); Joel F.
Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"--Wrong for Welfare, Wrong for Poverty, 2
Geo. J. on Fighting Poverty 3, 17 (1994) (discussing the Work Incentives Program, the
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Because they now must work to receive benefits, welfare recipients
resemble state employees rather than wards of the state. The new
emphasis on "earning" welfare has prompted discussions about
whether the Fair Labor Standards Act of 193810 ("ELSA") applies to
persons who work for their welfare benefits." Specifically, the De-
partment of Labor ("DOL") interpreted the FLSA in light of the
PRA's work requirements to determine whether the minimum wage
provisions of the FLSA apply to welfare workers.'" The DOL has
tentatively answered the question, "yes."'1 3 While this question is not
predecessor to JOBS). JOBS, created under the FSA, attempted to increase a recipi-
ent's incentive to work by increasing the amount that Aid to Families With Depen-
dent Children ("AFDC") recipients could earn without losing benefits. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 602(a)(8)(A) (1994) (repealed 1996). This type of program, when implemented in
the past, had caused little change in work levels among welfare recipients. See Mary
Bryna Sanger, Welfare Reform Within a Changing Context: Redefining the Terms of
the Debate, 23 Fordham Urb. L.J. 273,294 n.128 (1996) (stating that during 1961-1973,
AFDC-recipient participation in the work force fluctuated between 15% and 16%).
Indeed, such measures may have increased the number of persons eligible for welfare.
See id. at 294. The FSA had some work requirements but was constrained by the
funding system. See Diller, supra, at 23. The PRA, on the other hand, is much more
demanding of recipients than any of its predecessors. See id. at 31 (arguing that the
PRA is intended to force people off of welfare).
10. Ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219).
11. See Alison Mitchell, Clinton Urges Minimum Wage for Workfare, N.Y. Times,
July 29, 1997, at A16; Robert Pear, Republican Leaders Exempt 'Workfare' From La-
bor Laws, N.Y. Times, July 19, 1997, at A7; see also Richard L. Berke, Gingrich
Promises to Fight Clinton on Welfare Law, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1997, at Al (stating
that, despite recent political setbacks, Senator Gingrich intended to continue fighting
against the minimum wage for workfare workers).
12. See Department of Labor, Guidance: How Workplace Laws Apply to Welfare
Recipients (visited August 18, 1998) <http://gatekeeper.dol.gov/dol/asp/public/w2w/
welfare.htm> ("Federal employment laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act...
apply to welfare recipients as they apply to other workers."); Press Briefing by Mike
McCurry, White House Office of Communications (May 16, 1997) [hereinafter Press
Briefing] (anticipating that the DOL would determine that, as a matter of law, the
FLSA applied to workfare participants), available in 1997 WL 276200. But see David
L. Gregory, Br(e)aking the Exploitation of Labor?: Tensions Regarding the Welfare
Workforce, 25 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1, 25 n.163 (1997) ("Federal protections not applica-
ble to welfare workers include federal wage and hour, unemployment compensation
or workplace safety and health laws.").
13. See Department of Labor, supra note 12. But see Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d
1544 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that work performed under Utah's workfare program is
not "employment" within the meaning of the FLSA). The program evaluated by the
Johns court, however, was established under the FSA, a predecessor to the PRA. See
id. at 1544. The FSA was different because it provided incentives for training and
education, while the PRA mandates work activities. See Diller, supra note 9, at 20-25;
Lindsay Mara Schoen, Note, Working Welfare Recipients: A Comparison of the Fam-
ily Support Act and the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act, 24 Fordham Urb. L.J. 635, 644-49 (1997). Participants in at least one federal
workfare program, Welfare-to-Work, are covered by federal and state anti-discrimina-
tion laws. See 20 C.F.R. § 645.255(a) (1998) (stating that Welfare-to-Work participants
shall have the same Federal discrimination in employment protections as other em-
ployees). Welfare-to-Work is a sub-program of Temporary Aid to Needy Families
("TANF") targeted at "hard-to-employ" individuals. See id. § 645.212. The Depart-
ment of Agriculture ("USDA") also created a workfare program for food stamps, see
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fully resolved, this Note assumes that workfare 4 participants are em-
ployees who are covered by the FLSA. 15 This answer, however, pro-
vokes further inquiry.
The FLSA requires that employers pay their employees the mini-
mum wage.'6 Employers may pay wages in cash 7 or in the form of
non-cash benefits,'" also known as "in-kind benefits." In-kind bene-
fits are services or goods that the employer provides to the em-
ployee,' 9 such as food, housing, or other services.20
Welfare recipients who participate in workfare programs receive
cash benefits and non-cash benefits.2 ' Non-cash benefits include Tem-
7 C.F.R. § 273.22 (1998), under which workfare participants are protected by the Fed-
eral or state minimum wage, whichever is higher. See id. § 273.22(e)(2). It is, how-
ever, optional for the states. See id. § 273.22. For a discussion of problems with food
stamp workfare programs in light of the FLSA, see discussion infra Part III.B.1.
14. Workfare workers are persons who perform activities defined in 42 U.S.C.
§ 607(d)(1)-(12) (Supp. II 1996) in exchange for their welfare benefits.
15. Whether or not workfare participants are "employees" within the meaning of
the FLSA is not settled, although the DOL, which is responsible for enforcing the
FLSA, see 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1994), has stated that the FLSA applies to workfare
programs. See Department of Labor, supra note 12 ("Federal employment laws, such
as the Fair Labor Standards Act... apply to welfare recipients as they apply to other
workers."); see also Jason DeParle, White House Calls for Mininmum Wage in
Workfare Plan, N.Y. Tumes, May 16, 1997, at Al ("[T]he White House said today that
most of the recipients being placed in work programs should be covered by minimum-
wage laws."). The House Committee on Education and the Work Force and the
House Committee on Ways and Means voted to exclude workfare workers from mini-
mum wage coverage through federal budget legislation. See Robert Pear, G.O.P. in
House Moves to Bar Minimum Wage for Workfare, N.Y. Times, June 12, 1997, at B16.
Ultimately, the House's proposals were not included in 1998 legislation. See Peter T.
Kilborn, In Budget Bil4 President Wins Welfare Battle, N.Y. Times, Aug. 1, 1997, at
Al.
Some states have attempted to address the issue of whether workfare participants
are employees through legislation. For example, states may specify that workfare par-
ticipants are not employees of the State or municipality in which they work. See, e.g.,
Ark. Code Ann. § 21-5-604 (Michie 1996) (stating that workfare participants are not
employees of the state, workfare does not create an employer-employee contract, and
workfare participants may not receive workers' compensation); Ind. Code Ann. § 12-
20-11-5(a) (Michie 1997) ("Work performed under this chapter is considered as satis-
faction of a condition for poor relief and is not considered as services performed for
remuneration or as repayment for poor relief assistance."); see also Costello v. Board
of Review, Dep't of Labor, 642 A.2d 1034, 1036 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994)
(holding that a workfare participant was not entitled to unemployment compensa-
tion). But see 7 U.S.C. § 2029(a)(1), (d)(2) (1994) (stating that food stamp workers
must receive the same benefits as other workers performing the same work); Wis.
Stat. Ann. 49.147(3) (West 1997) (granting a workfare participant workers' compensa-
tion rights).
16. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
17. See id.
18. See id § 203(m).
19. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.2 (1997).
20. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
21. The exact benefits received depend on the jurisdiction and the circumstances
of the recipient. See Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1996 Green Book: Background Material and Data on Programs Within the Jurisdic-
19981
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porary Aid to Needy Families ("TANF") and Food Stamps.22 TANF 23
benefits are delivered in the form of cash, housing subsidies, child
care, transportation, furniture, and other benefits.24 Workfare re-
quires that a welfare recipient perform "work activities" in exchange
for or as a condition of receipt of TANF benefits.25
Generally, when a state's cash benefits are divided by the hours
those workfare participants must engage in work activities, the result
is less than the minimum wage. 6 States expose themselves to liability
under the FLSA if they do not pay their employees the minimum
wage. 27 Non-cash benefits may rectify the difference between cash
benefits and the minimum wage.
This Note examines whether the non-cash benefits received by
workfare participants may be considered "wages" within the meaning
of the FLSA. Part I of this Note provides a history of the FLSA and
tion of the Comm. on Ways and Means 384-85 (Comm. Print 1996); N.Y. Comp.
Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.2 (1997) (describing New York's benefits).
22. See 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1994) (food stamps); 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. 11 1996)
(TANF).
23. TANF replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC"). See Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, § 103(a)(1), 110 Stat. 2105, 2112.
24. States have a free hand in doling benefits. See Staff of House Comm. on Ways
and Means, supra note 21, at 384-85; 20 C.F.R. § 645.220(e) (authorizing states in
Welfare-to-Work programs to give recipients transportation assistance, substance
abuse treatment, child care, emergency housing, and "other supportive services"); see
also N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.2 (1997) (listing the same types of
assistance that authorized by the federal Welfare-to-Work programs).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(d)(1)-(12) (Supp. II 1996); 7 C.F.R. § 273.7 (1998)
(describing the USDA's food stamp work requirements); see also infra note 190 (list-
ing work activities). State workfare programs are called by various names. See, e.g.,
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 346-29 (Michie Supp. 1997) (First to Work Program); Ind. Code
Ann. § 12-20-11 (Michie 1997) (Workfare); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4316-A(2)
(West 1997) (Municipal Work Program); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 5107-42 (Anderson
Supp. 1997) (Works First); 62 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62, § 405-1 (West 1996) (Road to
Economic Self-Sufficiency Through Employment and Training); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 49.141 (West 1997) (Wisconsin Works); see also Staff of House Comm. on Ways and
Means, supra note 21, at 404-08 (listing programs in states as of January 1994).
26. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A) (setting the 1998 minimum average hours
per week of work at 20), with N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.2(d) (1997)
(fixing monthly cash grant levels for one person at $112). Thus, the federal law re-
quires 20 hours of work per week, while the state's benefits, in light of this 20-hour
requirement, pay only $28 per week, or $1.40 per hour. If one includes New York's
shelter allowance, see id. §§ 352.2(d), 352.3, and home energy payments, see id.
§ 352.2(d), then a worker's wage based on a twenty-hour workweek is $5.50 per hour,
above the minimum wage. The minimum hours, however, will increase to 30 at year
2000, and remain at 30 every year thereafter. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(c)(1)(A) (Supp. II
1996). Based on a thirty-hour workweek, the worker's wage would be $3.70, assuming
benefits remain constant. Cf Diller, supra note 9, at 24 (stating that states may assign
workfare workers to up to 40 hours of work per week, further depressing workfare
wages).
27. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 215-216 (1994) (providing public and private rights of action
for FLSA violations). But see infra note 29 (discussing the split of authority over
whether the FLSA can be enforced against state governments by state courts).
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examines the FLSA's wage regulation and the legal tests courts have
applied to FLSA wage issues. Part I also discusses the FLSA exemp-
tions created by Congress. Part H reviews the PRA and the require-
ments it places on states and workfare participants. Part III asks
whether non-cash benefits are in-kind benefits that states may credit
against the wages the states owe workfare workers. Part III concludes
that states cannot receive credit for in-kind benefits. Part IV looks at
one proposed solution, the creation of a workfare exemption, and ex-
amines several others.' This Note concludes that states must employ
a combination of methods to satisfy their obligations under the FLSA
and the PRA.29
I. THE FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT
Although sixty-two years separate the passage of the PRA and the
FLSA, the PRA's work requirements raise labor questions with re-
spect to the PRA's application within the rubric of the FLSA. This
part discusses the history of the Fair Labor Standards Act. This part
also explains non-cash wages and the development of exemptions
from the FLSA.
28. From time to time, solutions have been discussed. See Press Briefing. supra
note 12 ("It may be the case that some states are going to elect to cover some of their
folks who are workfare participants under the trainee provision of the Fair Labor
Standards Act."); see also Diller, supra note 9, at 27 & n.114 (observing that the DOL
guidance leaves open the possibility that workfare programs may be structured to
avoid paying workers the minimum cash wage). Food stamps may only be included,
however, if the state participates in a special food stamp program administered by the
USDA. See 7 U.S.C. § 2013 (1994); Department of Labor, supra note 12. The
USDA's Guidance is appended at the end of the DOL's Guidance.
29. This Note's conclusions suggest that some workfare employees have claims
against some states under the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 215 (1994) (prohibiting viola-
tions of the FLSA); id. § 216(a)-(c) (providing for maximum sLx-month prison term
and maximum $10,000 fine, and creating a civil right of action for back wages, attor-
neys fees, and liquidated damages equal to back wages). Federal courts may not,
however, grant back wages and liquidated damages because of states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from private suits in federal courts. See U.S. Const. amend.
XI; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Con-
gress may not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suits of citi-
zens pursuant to its Article I powers). In addition, state courts are split on whether
state courts must enforce the FLSA. Compare Ahern v. State, 4 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d
(BNA) 1342, 1344 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity does not apply to states when private citizens sue the state in that state's courts
under federal law), with Alden v. State, No. CUM-97-446, 1998 WL 439259, at *3
(Me. Aug. 4, 1998) (holding, by a vote of four to two, that Eleventh Amendment
immunity protected the state from defending against an FLSA lawsuit in that state's
courts). An alternative is to file suit under state law. See Enzian v. Wing, 670
N.Y.S.2d 283, 284-85 (App. Div. 1998) (mem.); Brukhman v. Giuliani, 662 N.Y.S.2d
914, 920 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding, on state law grounds, that welfare workers had to
be paid the higher prevailing wage for work performed, not the minimum wage),
rev'd, 1998 WL 635655, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div. Sept. 17, 1998) (mem.).
1998]
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A. The History of the FLSA
The Great Depression spurred congressional efforts to create a na-
tional minimum wage." This legislative impetus first manifested itself
in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 ("NIRA"),31 which
the Supreme Court promptly struck down.32 Undaunted, President
Roosevelt continued advocating for national wage standards. 33 The
original FLSA bill, as introduced in Congress, was very different from
the final law.34 The original bill created a Fair Labor Standards Board
that could raise or lower minimum wages and maximum hours within
industries;35 however, as the FLSA bill labored through Congress, it
was amended several times, and the final version was much more rigid
than the original.36
It appeared that the FLSA would suffer the same fate as the
NIRA.37 Fortuitously, one vote on the Court changed,38 and the
Court, in a prelude to later decisions,39 upheld state minimum-wage
legislation.4" Subsequently, Congress passed the FLSA, and it became
law on June 25, 1938.41 The FLSA survived constitutional scrutiny.42
Congress intended the FLSA to protect low-end wage earners and
to ensure that they possessed economic power and self-sufficiency by
increasing employment opportunities and guaranteeing workers a
30. See William P. Quigley, "A Fair Day's Pay for a Fair Day's Work": Time to
Raise and Index the Minimum Wage, 27 St. Mary's L.J. 513, 517 (1996).
31. Ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 199 (1933), amended by Act of June 14, 1935, ch. 246, 49
Stat. 375, terminated by Exec. Order No. 7323, 3 C.F.R. 149 (1936-1938).
32. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935).
Although the NIRA was struck because it was an unconstitutionally broad delegation
of power to the Executive Branch, see id. at 537, the Court had consistently invali-
dated state minimum wage laws as well. See infra note 37.
33. See John S. Forsythe, Legislative History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 6
Law & Contemp. Probs. 464, 466-74 (1939) (detailing the Congressional debate over
the FLSA); Quigley, supra note 30, at 522.
34. See Forsythe, supra note 33, at 474.
35. See id. at 475.
36. See id. at 466-90.
37. See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex. rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610-11 (1936)
(invalidating New York's minimum wage laws because they violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, specifically a person's freedom to contract),
overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Assoc., 313
U.S. 236 (1941). Olsen reflects the Court's jurisprudential shift.
38. See Quigley, supra note 30, at 526-27. "Why Justice Roberts changed his vote,
which apparently was cast, though not announced, before President Roosevelt pub-
licly revealed his Court-packing plan, has been hotly debated since the day Parrish
was decided." Id. at 527. Parrish was the landmark case in which the Supreme Court
reversed itself on this issue. See infra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) ("[I]t is no longer
open to question that the fixing of a minimum wage is within the legislative power and
that the bare fact of its exercise is not a denial of due process . . ").
40. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 397-98 (1937).
41. See Willis J. Nordlund, A Brief History of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 39
Lab. L.J. 715, 721 (1988).
42. See Darby, 312 U.S. at 125.
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cash wage.43 The FLSA created a national minimum wage' and an
overtime wage.4 5 The minimum wage is the minimum amount of
money an employer must pay an employee per hour worked for the
first forty hours of service in a seven-day period. 6 Employees who
work more than forty hours in a seven-day period trigger the overtime
provision of the FLSA. In such instances, employees are compen-
sated at 150% of their regular wage for hours they work above forty
within any seven-day period.47 Congress implicitly sanctioned this
forty-hour workweek by implementing a fifty percent wage increase
penalty.4s
The FLSA is a remedial law.49 Congress, through its plenary power
to regulate interstate commerce, intended this Act to correct the eco-
nomic evils of the Great Depression.5 0 The Act contains a statement
of congressional findings:
[T]he existence, in industries engaged in commerce or in the pro-
duction of goods for commerce, of labor conditions detrimental to
the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for
health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers (1) causes com-
merce and the channels and instrumentalities of commerce to be
used to spread and perpetuate such labor conditions among the
workers of the several States; (2) burdens commerce and the free
flow of goods in commerce; (3) constitutes an unfair method of
competition in commerce; (4) leads to labor disputes burdening and
obstructing commerce and the free flow of goods in commerce; and
(5) interferes with the orderly and fair marketing of goods in
commerce.
5 1
Congress intended to strike at the "unequal bargaining power [that
existed] between employer and employee." 2 Congress established a
balance of power between the employer and the employee by protect-
ing certain groups of the population, including women, children, and
non-union workers,53 from "substandard wages" and "excessive
43. See generally Quigley, supra note 30, at 529 (observing that the FLSA was
intended to improve the living conditions of workers).
44. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1994).
45. See id § 207.
46. See id. § 206(a)(1).
47. See id. § 207(a)(1).
48. See id The maximum hours provision was downwardly graduated: 1938, 44
hours; 1939,42 hours; 1940,40 hours. See Fair Labor Standards Act, ch. 676, § 7(a)(1)-
(3), 52 Stat. 1060, 1063 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 207).
49. See A.H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945).
50. See Quigley, supra note 30, at 517.
51. 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1994).
52. Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945); see Walling v. Peavy-
Wilson Lumber Co., 49 F. Supp. 846, 861 (W.D. La. 1943) (noting that in certain
situations the employer and employee are not on "equal contracting terms").
53. "To conserve our primary resources of manpower, Government must have
some control over maximum hours, minimum wages, the evil of child labor, and the
exploitation of unorganized labor." Statutory History of the United States: Labor
1998] 209
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hours" that were dangerous to the national health and well-being."
Congress also sought to ensure employees a cash wage, believing that
"the individual worker should have both the freedom and the respon-
sibility to allocate his minimum wage among competing economic and
personal interests."55
Although today cash wages are the norm, non-cash or "in-kind"
wages were much more common earlier this century. At the turn of
the century and for some time thereafter, businesses, typically in "fac-
tory towns" or "company stores," paid their workers in a variety of
forms, including housing or coupons which could be redeemed in ex-
change for goods. 6 Alternatively, these employers deducted ex-
penses such as board and lodging from their employees' wages.57
These practices deprived the worker of a portion of his cash wage.5 8
The FLSA laid down rules that regulated this deprivation.59
Congress also attempted to spread the economic benefits of em-
ployment as widely as possible.6" By creating a fifty percent increase
in a person's wage for hours worked above the maximum-hour ceil-
ing,61 Congress created an incentive for employers to reduce the
number of hours that individuals worked over that ceiling. If current
employees put in less time, then employers would be forced to hire
more employees.62 This, in turn, would reduce unemployment.63
Congress intended the FLSA's coverage to be very broad.6 Ini-
tially, the FLSA covered over eleven million workers.65 Although the
creation of a living wage was perceived as quite an achievement, the
percentage of workers covered was actually low. 6 6 Today, the FLSA
covers over seventy million people, or 85.6% of America's workers. 7
The fundamental protections provided by the FLSA have not
changed since 1936, aside from periodic increases in the amount of the
minimum wage.68 Congress, however, has broadened the scope of the
Organization 396-97 (Robert F. Koretz ed., 1970) (quoting President Roosevelt's spe-
cial message to Congress, May 24, 1937).
54. See Brooklyn Say. Bank, 324 U.S. at 706, 707 n.18.
55. Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by
McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co., 486 U.S. 128, 134-35 (1988).
56. See Peavy-Wilson, 49 F. Supp. at 856-58.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See infra Part I.B (describing the regulation of non-cash wages by the FLSA).
60. See James Ledvinka, Federal Regulation of Personnel and Human Resource
Management 249 (1982).
61. For overtime work, the law provides for a 50% increase in the employee's
wage, not 150% of the minimum wage. See 29 U.S.C. § 207 (1994).
62. See Ledvinka, supra note 60, at 249.
63. See id.
64. See Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assocs., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959).
65. See Quigley, supra note 30, at 530.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 535 n.104.
68. See id. at 544 n.141.
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FLSA several times.69 In 1974, Congress attempted to bring State and
municipal employees within the scope of the FLSA.70 The Supreme
Court initially held that state employee coverage was unconstitu-
tional,7' but reversed itself within a decade. 2-
The FLSA contains three important provisions that affect an em-
ployee's right to a minimum cash wage. First, the FLSA authorizes
the payment of non-cash wages,7' which allows employers to pay a
portion of their employees' minimum wage in the form of non-cash
benefits.74 Second, the FLSA provides for the payment of sub-mini-
mum wages to trainees and learners.75 Third, classes of employees are
exempt from the minimum wage and overtime aegis of the FLSA.76
The following sections discuss these provisions.
B. Non-Cash Wages Under the FLSA
Non-cash wages must fulfill three criteria to be counted toward the
minimum wage. An employer may pay an employee non-cash wages
only if the benefits are customarily furnished,77 acceptance of these
benefits by the employee is voluntary,78 and the employer deducts
from the employee's cash wage only the reasonable cost of providing
the benefits, and not the market value of the benefits. 79
The next section examines the legal tests that determine whether an
employer may credit non-cash benefits against wages owed to employ-
ees. These tests ask several questions: whether the benefit is (1) cus-
tomarily furnished, (2) credited at the reasonable cost or fair value to
the employer, and (3) accepted voluntarily by the employee. This
69. See, eg., Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L 93-259,
§ 23(a)(1), 88 Stat. 55, 69 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 213) (repealing exemption of em-
ployees in motion picture theaters); id. § 12(a), 88 Stat. at 64 (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 207, 213) (repealing exemption of employees of institutions other than hospitals
that cared for the sick); id. § 13(a), 88 Stat. at 64 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207,
213) (amending exemptions related to hotel, motel, and restaurant employees).
70. See id § 6(a), 88 Stat. at 58-60 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 204, 207, 208,
216).
71. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847-52 (1976).
72. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1985).
The law was recast as the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1985, Pub. L No. 99-
150, 99 Stat. 787 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 203, 207, 211).
73. See infra Part I.B.
74. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m) (1994).
75. See infra Part I.C.
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (exempting certain employees from minimum wage and
maximum hour requirements); id. § 213(b) (exempting certain employees from maxi-
mum hour requirements only). For a discussion of these exemptions, see infra part
I.C.
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(m).
78. See Williams v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 1 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 289,296
(E.D.N.C. 1940); 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (1997) ("Not only must the employee receive the
benefits of the facility for which he is charged, but it is essential that his acceptance of
the facility be voluntary and uncoerced.").
79. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.3.
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framework is the basis of this Note's analysis of welfare in-kind bene-
fits, and answers the question of whether states may take credit for
non-cash benefits.80
1. The Customarily Furnished Test
Department of Labor regulations state that in-kind benefits must be
customarily furnished to count as wages.8' The DOL has defined
"customarily" to mean that "the facilities are furnished regularly by
the employer to his employees or if the same or similar facilities are
customarily furnished by other employees engaged in the same or sim-
ilar trade, business, or occupation in the same or similar communi-
ties." 82 An example of customarily furnished benefits that are wages
under the FLSA is board and lodging.83 This is a question of fact, and
courts look to the particular circumstances of the case to decide the
issue.
For example, the Ninth Circuit, in Walling v. Alaska Pacific Consoli-
dated Mining Co.,'4 held that miners had to be paid an hourly wage as
opposed to split-time wages for their first forty hours of work per
week, and overtime for any time worked above forty hours.8 The
miners also received board and lodging. 6 The miners had specifically
contracted to have board and lodging expenses deducted from their
weekly earnings.87 The Company argued that the workers could agree
in contract-formed just prior to the initiation of the suit-to deduct
the cost of board and lodging from overtime payments.88 The court
disagreed, finding that the cost of board and lodging must be included
in the weekly rate of pay. 9 In reaching this conclusion, the court
looked to how the Company had dealt with the miners in the past,
according to employee tradition and industry custom.90
The legislative history of the FLSA suggests that employers had to
provide services to receive the credit for in-kind benefits.9 It did not
matter whether the employee took full advantage of the benefits. The
80. See infra Part III.
81. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.30-.31.
82. Id. § 531.31; see Southern Pac. Co. v. Joint Council of Dining Car Employees,
Locals 456 & 582, 165 F.2d 26, 31-32 (9th Cir. 1947); Walling v. Alaska Pac. Consol.
Mining Co., 152 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 1945).
83. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.2(a).
84. 152 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1945).
85. See id. at 815. The Defendant devised split-time wages to evade paying more
money in wages under the FLSA. Every eight-hour day was divided into six hours of
regular wage work and two hours of overtime work, such that at the end of a seven-
day period, the employer paid its employees exactly as much as it had prior to the
passage of the FLSA. See id. at 813.
86. See id. at 813.
87. See id. at 814.
88. See id. at 815.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See S. Rep. No. 89-1487 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3015.
[Vol. 67
WORKFARE WAGES UNDER THE FLSA
Senate recognized in a 1966 report that meals provided by a restau-
rant were "board" which was "customarily furnished" by the em-
ployer, regardless of whether the employees ate the meals.92 The
Northern District of Georgia, in Melton v. Round Table Restaurants,
Inc.,93 agreed. The court held that meals served to waitresses every
work day at the same time constituted a "customary" benefit. The
Melton court described the delivery of meals as "customary in the
trade," and labeled the plaintiffs experts in the restaurant industry in
terms of customs.94 Additionally, inconsistent use of the benefit did
not impact upon the validity of the credit. The "mere fact that some
employees did not uniformly avail themselves of the meals constitutes
no bar, any more than would the failure to use furnished lodging every
single night .... ,"g Thus, according to the court, as long as the em-
ployer regularly furnishes the benefits to the employees, it can take
credit for them.
Within the phrase "customarily furnished," "furnished" has a sepa-
rate definition and distinct legal requirements. In order to be "fur-
nished," the employee must receive the benefits of the facility.' The
furnishings must be for the benefit of the employee. 7 The facilities
may not be tokens, coupons, or things recognized as valuable only
within the employer-employee relationship.9" If the facilities are pri-
marily for the benefit of the employer, no credit may be taken.99
In Southern Pacific Co. v. Joint Council Dining Car Employees, Lo-
cals 456 & 582,1°° the Ninth Circuit held that meals eaten by waiters
92. I1d, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3002, 3015.
93. 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 532, 534 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
94. Id.
95. Id
96. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (1997).
97. See id § 531.31(d)(1).
98. See id. § 531.28.
99. See Shultz v. Bradley, 67 Labor Cas. (CCH) 7 32,650, at 45,248 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(holding that employer receives no credit if in-kind wage is for convenience of em-
ployer). Wages are for the sole benefit of the employee, whether they are in-kind
benefits or in cash. If an employer received wage credit for a service that benefited
the employer, the exception would be turned on its head. For example, tools, safety
caps, goggles, police protection, and insurance may not be credited because they are
for the benefit of the employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(c). Although an employee
derives some benefit from goggles and other safety measures, these are necessary
because of dangers located in the work environment. In the same vein, insurance
allows the employer to spread the costs of the business, and benefits the employer.
Thus, the employer may not take a credit for insurance against the employees' mini-
mum wage. The DOL interpretations cite the following examples of facilities that
may be credited against wages: meals furnished at company restaurants or by hospi-
tals, hotels, or restaurants to their employees; meals, dormitory rooms, and tuition
furnished by a college to its student employees; housing furnished for dwelling pur-
poses; general merchandise furnished at company stores and commissaries (including
articles of food, clothing, and household effects); and fuel, electricity, water, and gas
furnished for the noncommercial, personal use of the employee. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 531.33.
100. 165 F.2d 26, 32 (9th Cir. 1947).
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aboard dining cars were "furnished" because they were primarily for
the benefit of the waiters. The Railroad paid its waiters less than the
minimum wage, and the parties stipulated that if the meals that the
waiters ate were "wages," then the Railroad satisfied its FLSA mini-
mum wage obligations. 1' The Southern Pacific court observed that
the Railroad served meals for at least two reasons: first, as a matter of
convenience for the Railroad, and second, as the price of employ-
ment."' 2 The Railroad admitted that if it did not give waiters meals, it
would seriously inconvenience train service to stop trains, let off the
waiters, and pick them up after they had eaten. 10 3 Additionally, the
court took judicial notice that the Railroad could require waiters to
bring their own meals or make deductions for the meals they ate." °4
The court found important, however, the fact that the waiters ate their
meals on their own time. The Railroad derived no benefit from this
other than the benefit that the Railroad would expect from paying the
waiters cash, namely, obtaining the desired service.0 5 The court dif-
ferentiated meals eaten on the waiters' time from providing "switch-
ing irons to switchmen or ticket punching tools to a conductor"
because conductors and switchmen use those tools on the company's
time. 106
2. The Reasonable Cost Credit
In addition to being customarily furnished, non-cash benefits must
be credited at their reasonable cost in order to qualify as wages under
the FLSA.107 The FLSA authorizes the Secretary of the Department
of Labor to determine "reasonable cost" and "fair value." ' 8 Reason-
able cost represents the cost of the benefit to the employer, and does
not include "a profit to the employer."'0 9 Reasonable cost is another
method of preventing the employer from profiting from in-kind bene-
fits. Fair value is the reasonable cost other similarly situated employ-
ers paid for the benefits they provided their employees." 0 The
employer is prohibited from receiving any direct benefit, but the fact
that the employer may receive some incidental benefit from the pay-
ment of non-cash wages does not render these wages uncreditable.
101. See id. at 27-28.
102. See id. at 29.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. Id.
107. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (1997).
108. Id. § 531.33.
109. Hodgson v. Frisch Dixie, Inc., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 167, 170-71 (W.D.
Ky. 1971); see Dole v. Bishop, 740 F. Supp. 1221, 1227 (S.D. Miss. 1990) ("While
[defendant] testified at trial that he sought to claim credit for half the retail price of
the meals provided employees, he was unable to show that such an amount would
constitute the reasonable cost of these meals to defendants.").
110. See 740 F. Supp. at 1227.
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For example, the Eighth Circuit held that where four employees
were given a $300 credit for living quarters, the primary beneficiaries
were the employee-tenants, even though the company gained some
incidental benefit from the fact that the employees lived at the place
of business."' The rationale underlying the reasonable cost rule ap-
pears to be that the employer must be in the same position as if it had
paid the wages in cash.
3. Voluntary Acceptance Requirement
Acceptance of any non-cash wages by employees must also be vol-
untary." 2 The few courts that have considered the meaning of "vol-
untary and uncoerced" have not agreed on one definition. 1 3 The
divergence of opinions, however, has been recognized by courts on
only a few occasions. 14 The majority"1 5 of courts have held that when
employees know or reasonably should know they must accept in-kind
benefits as part of their job, and they voluntarily and without coercion
accept that job, then the regulatory and statutory requirements are
satisfied." 6 On the other hand, the minority rule states that employ-
ees must be offered a choice between cash wages and the in-kind
benefits." 7
a. Majority Rule
While "few courts have had occasion to construe" the DOL regula-
tions' "voluntary and uncoerced" language,""8 those that have done so
generally refuse to construe "customarily furnished" to mean "volun-
tarily accepted" or freely chosen by employees. 1 9 Courts have held
that when an employee accepts a job voluntarily and without coercion,
111. See Marshall v. Truman Arnold Distrib. Co., 640 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1981)
(explaining that the employer incidentally benefited from the prevention of vandalism
to living quarters and workplace).
112. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (1997).
113. See infra notes 121-45 and accompanying text.
114. See Lopez v. Rodriguez, 668 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Donovan v. Miller
Properties, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 785 (M.D. La. 1982), affd, 711 F.2d 49, 50 (5th Cir.
1983); Davis Bros., Inc. v. Marshall, 522 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Williams v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 1 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 289 (E.D.N.C. 1940).
115. The word "majority" is used with some equivocation. Rulings on this issue are
rare, and few courts have published opinions on the matter. See Lopez, 668 F.2d at
1379.
116. See, e.g., i. at 1380 (holding that "voluntary" may be inferred from job accept-
ance); Morrison, Inc. v. Marshall, 25 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 122, 124 (S.D. Ala.
1981) (observing that the circumstances of employment may determine whether job
acceptance was voluntary).
117. See infra notes 139-43 and accompanying text.
118. Lopez, 668 F.2d at 1379.
119. See Hodgson v. Frisch Dixie, Inc., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 167, 170-71
(W.D. Ky. 1971).
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such acceptance automatically includes the in-kind benefits the em-
ployer may bestow upon the employed.12 °
Davis Bros., Inc. v. Donovan21 a exemplifies the majority rule. In
Davis Bros., the Eleventh Circuit held that "voluntary" does not re-
quire employee choice. 122 The court reasoned that acceptance of the
benefit is a condition of employment, and if the employee entered
into that agreement freely, then the benefit was accepted volunta-
rily.'" The defendant had deducted the cost of meals it furnished to
employees from the cash component of the minimum wage.'24 As a
result, the employees' wages were reduced by twenty-five to thirty-
five cents per hour, bringing their cash wage below the federal mini-
mum.125 In addition, the employer received the credit for the meal
whether or not the employees ate the meals.' 26 The Secretary of La-
bor argued that if the meal credit was mandatory, it could not have
been voluntary. 12 The court disagreed with that position,121 finding
that the Secretary of Labor "has read into the statute a voluntary-
choice-by-employee provision that Congress did not require.' 29
Similarly, the court, in Tippie v. Affordable Inns, Inc.,13° implicitly
held that an employer did not have to offer the employee a choice
between lodging and cash. 13' Specifically, the court found that where
the in-kind benefit is a necessary part of the employment agreement,
acceptance is voluntary and uncoerced.132 Thus, the court observed,
employers did not have to offer employees a choice because the em-
ployees had already made that choice when they accepted the job:
Where living in an apartment is an essential part of the contract of
employment as a motel employee, and, but for the employee's will-
ingness to agree thereto, employees would not have been hired,
apartment allowance is a part of the employee's compensation for
purposes of determining the rate of minimum and overtime to be
paid. 13
3
The court, therefore, inferred that employees made a "voluntary"
choice through acceptance of the job.
120. See Lopez, 668 F.2d at 1380; Donovan v. Miller Properties, 547 F. Supp. 785,
789 (M.D. La. 1982), affd, 711 F.2d 49, 50 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. 700 F.2d 1368 (11th Cir. 1983).
122. See id. at 1372.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 1369.
125. See id. at 1369-70.
126. See id. at 1369.
127. See id. at 1370 (citing the DOL's interpretation of 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (1981)).
128. See id. at 1369-73.
129. Id. at 1369.
130. 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 975 (W.D. Okla. 1980).
131. See id. at 979-81.
132. See id. at 981.
133. Id.
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The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia applied the same
concept in Lopez v. Rodriguez."M The employee had accepted a job
as a housekeeper who performed numerous tasks.1 35
[A]ppellants were concededly seeking to employ a "live-in" house-
keeper and babysitter when they hired appellee. If appellee under-
stood this when she accepted the job, and if her acceptance of the
job was voluntary and uncoerced, then it is idle to inquire whether
her initial acceptance of board and lodging was voluntary and un-
coerced. Appellee had no choice but to accept the lawful "live-in"
condition if she desired the job.'36
The Lopez court recognized that this doctrine had its limits. t 37 The
court held that in the special case of housekeepers who depend on
their employers for shelter, conditions could become so onerous such
that the employee would not have accepted them when first offered
the employment.1 38
b. Minority View
Some courts, in accordance with the minority view, have held that
employers must offer employees a choice between cash and non-cash
wages if employers intend to offer in-kind benefits at all. For exam-
ple, in Marshall v. New Floridian Hotel,'39 the court held that the Ho-
tel failed to offer its employees, whom it paid in cash wages and in
non-cash wages, a choice between the cash and non-cash wages.' 40
The Hotel had sheltered several employees on the premises, gave
them meals, and deducted rent from their wages.14' The court stated
that the employer had a duty to provide its employees with an option
to receive cash instead of food and lodging prior to the employees'
acceptance of those benefits.142 The court held that absent choice,
"lodging or other facilities is not voluntary and uncoerced and thus
134. 668 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
135. See id. at 1378.
136. Id. at 1380.
137. Later in its opinion, the court equivocated: "fAin employer may impose 'coer-
cive' conditions-that is, conditions so onerous and restrictive that the employee's
continued employment and acceptance of board and lodging ceases to be voluntary."
Id.
138. See id.
139. Marshall v. New Floridian Hotel, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 530 (S.D. Fla.
1979), affd on other grounds sub no,:. Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, 676 F.2d
468, 473 (11th Cir. 1982) (declining to consider the District Court's finding that, as a
matter of law, the defendant below should have offered its employees a choice be-
tween cash and non-cash wages).
140. See id. at 539.
141. See id. at 538-39.
142. See id.; accord Davis Bros., Inc. v. Marshall, 522 F. Supp. 628, 630-31 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) ("By preventing employers from forcing employees to accept unwanted
meals and lodging as part of their wages, the regulation serves this Congressional
goal."), rev'd, 700 F.2d 1368, 1369 (11th Cir. 1983); Hodgson v. Frisch Dixie, Inc., 20
Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 167, 170-71 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
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such may not be considered 'furnished'... as part of wages paid the
employee .... 143
The court, in Reich v. Giaimo,'4 held that employees must specifi-
cally choose child care benefits if those benefits are to be counted
against the employees' minimum wage. The court stated that "an em-
ployee's acceptance of [child care benefits] as part of his or her wages
must be voluntary and uncoerced.' 1 45 The Giaimo court did not give
any reasons why childcare might be differentiated from other in-kind
benefits such as food or lodging. Underlying the court's reasoning,
however, may have been the notion that employers should not be in a
position to compel employee acceptance of childcare, thereby reduc-
ing an employer's cash wage. This would give employers a device by
which to reduce employees' cash wage whether or not employees ben-
efit from the in-kind benefits.
c. FLSA Exemptions
Congress has created exemptions to the minimum wage and maxi-
mum hour provisions of the FLSA. These exemptions are grounded
in policy concerns, which in some instances trump the FLSA's mini-
mum wage requirements. This part explores those policies.
Many types of employees are exempt from the FLSA. Exemptions
are defined by statute. 146 Employees may be exempt from the mini-
mum wage law, the overtime law, or both.'47 The following employ-
ees are exempt from the minimum wage and overtime requirements
of the Act: any person working in an executive, administrative, or
professional capacity; 148 persons employed by an amusement or recre-
ational establishment; 149 seamen;150 farmers and agricultural labor,
within certain limits;15 1 non-American seamen;152 certain newspaper
employees;153 domestic babysitters and domestic companionship prov-
iders:-' 54 certain criminal investigators;'5 5 and computer systems ana-
lysts, computer programmers, and computer engineers. 156 Other
classes of employees are exempt only from the overtime requirements
of the FLSA.157 They include: employees of rail carriers, air carriers,
143. New Floridian Hotel, 24 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) at 539.
144. 1 Wage & Hour Cas. 2d (BNA) 1681 (E.D. Mo. 1994).
145. Id. at 1688.
146. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 213-214 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
147. See id. § 214.
148. See id. § 213(a)(1).
149. See id. § 213(a)(3).
150. See id. § 213(a)(5).
151. See id. § 213(a)(6).
152. See id. § 213(a)(12).
153. See id. § 213(a)(8).
154. See id. § 213(a)(15).
155. See id. § 213(a)(16).
156. See id. § 213(a)(17).
157. See id. § 213(b).
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outside purchasers of poultry, eggs, cream, or milk, seamen, some ra-
dio and television announcers and engineers, certain drivers, mechan-
ics, and salesmen.158  Congress has considered making workfare
participants exempt from the FLSA, 159 and a majority vote in Con-
gress may overturn DOL interpretations.
Policy concerns underlie Congress's exemption choices."60 For ex-
ample, there are instances when federal regulation is inappropriate,
redundant, or interferes too greatly in the customs and practices be-
tween employers and employees. 16' Congress also intended to leave
local commerce, such as agriculture and town stores,162 under the con-
trol of the states. 63 Congress articulated exemptions for employees
who were regulated by other laws.1 ' Finally, the FLSA and DOL
regulations make exceptions to the minimum wage for full-time stu-
dents in retail or agriculture, student learners, apprentices, learners,
messengers, student workers, workers with disabilities, and
homeworkers. 65
Full-time students working in certain industries may be paid less
than the minimum wage.' 66 Students may be paid eighty-five percent
of the minimum wage if they meet certain conditions. 67 Employment
must be "necessary in order to prevent curtailment of opportunities
for employment;" employment of students cannot create a substantial
probability of reducing the opportunities for full-time employment for
other persons; no abnormal labor conditions, such as a strike or lock-
out may exist; other wage rates are not reduced; and the employer
must not have any serious outstanding DOL violations on record."n
The FLSA also makes provision for "student-learners" to be paid no
less than seventy-five percent of the minimum wage.169 Student-learn-
158. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(b) (1994).
159. While this suggests that welfare workers are covered, there is much disagree-
ment on this point. See supra note 13.
160. Congress created exemptions where Federal regulation was impractical, re-
dundant, or deemed unnecessary for reasons grounded in public policy. See supra
note 163. But see Quigley, supra note 30, at 531-33 (arguing that exclusions were polit-
ically motivated to exclude women and southern African-Americans).
161. See Southland Gasoline Co. v. Bayley, 319 U.S. 44, 48-49 (1943).
162. See Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657, 669 (1946).
163. See Homemakers, Home & Health Care Servs., Inc. v. Carden, 538 F.2d 98,
102 (6th Cir. 1976).
164. See Southland Gasoline, 319 U.S. at 48-49; Boutell v. Walling, 148 F.2d 329
(6th Cir. 1945), affd, 327 U.S. 463 (1946). For example, the Interstate Commerce
Commission regulated the hours of truckers, who were otherwise covered by the plain
language of the FLSA. See Boutell, 327 U.S. at 467 (discussing the regulatory relation-
ship between the FLSA and the Interstate Commerce Commission).
165. See 29 U.S.C. § 214 (1994). A "learner," differentiated from a student, is a
person who is being trained for an occupation not "customarily recognized as an ap-
prenticeable trade." 29 C.F.R. § 520.300a (1998).
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 214(b).
167. See 29 C.F.R. § 519.1-.2 (1997).
168. See id. § 519.5.
169. See 29 U.S.C. § 214(a); 29 C.F.R. § 520.506 (1998).
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ers are students "receiving instruction in an accredited school, college
or university and who [are] employed on a part-time basis, pursuant to
a bona fide vocational training program." 170 This exemption is similar
to the one for full-time students. The exemption may be granted only
when it is necessary to prevent the curtailment of employment oppor-
tunities,171 and student-learners may not displace full-time employ-
ees.17 2 Apprentices and learners are subject, in relevant part, to the
same regulatory terms as student-learners: they may not displace
other workers or depress wages, and they may only work if necessary
to prevent the curtailment of employment opportunities.
73
The FLSA formed the basis of wage protection in the United States,
and the minimum wage has been the tool of wage protection since
1938.'17 The FLSA broke new ground at the time, and established a
floor below which no employer could pay a wage earner, regardless of
the bargaining positions of the parties. Policy and practical considera-
tions, however, persuaded Congress to not extend protection to all
workers, and therefore Congress exempted certain classes of employ-
ees from coverage. 175 The Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 embraces different values that, at
certain crossroads of policy and practice, conflict with the FLSA. 17 6
The next part examines the PRA and its differing values.
II. THE PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND WORK OPPORTUNITY
RECONCILIATION ACT OF 1996
Riding the crest of a popular wave that demanded welfare re-
form, 7 7 President Clinton in 1994 promised to reform welfare. 78
Congress passed the PRA,'1 79 which eviscerated the federal govern-
ment's general assistance program, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children ("AFDC"), and fundamentally changed modern public
assistance.
The PRA eliminated the thirty-year-old AFDC program18 and
abolished welfare entitlement spending.18" ' The PRA replaced the en-
170. 29 C.F.R. § 520.201(c).
171. See 29 C.F.R. § 520.3(a) (1997).
172. See id. § 520.5(g). There are other requirements specific to the training pro-
gram. See id. § 520.5.
173. See 29 C.F.R. § 520.201(d) (1998) (apprentices); id. § 520.201(b) (learners).
174. See generally Quigley, supra note 30, at 519-29 (discussing the history of the
Act's passage and some of its rhetoric).
175. See 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1994).
176. See Diller, supra note 9, at 27.
177. See Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bill: A Long, Stormy Journey, N.Y.
Times, July 15, 1994, at Al.
178. See id.
179. See supra note 1.
180. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1994) (repealed 1996).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 601(b) (Supp. I1 1996). The number of persons on welfare has
decreased by 31% nationally in the last two years. See Barbara Vobejda, States to Get
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titlement spending with block grants, which were based on state and
federal spending levels of prior years."s The Act also imposed work
requirements on welfare recipients, set a five-year, non-continuous
time limit on the receipt of funds by any person, and prescribed mini-
mum rates of participation by one and two-parent families. 1 3
The work requirements of the PRA are mandatory."" Persons who
fail to comply with them face a pro-rata cut in benefitsas5 and may risk
losing cash assistance, 86 food stamps,'87 and housing subsidies.s
States have discretionary power to impose harsher sanctions upon re-
cipients who fail to meet the work requirements." s
The PRA lists twelve acceptable work activities.19° These activities
include subsidized work, unsubsidized work, vocational training, em-
$1 Billion Bonus for Welfare Reform, Washington Post, Feb. 17, 1998, at A5; Adminis-
tration for Children and Families, supra note 9 (listing the number of welfare recipi-
ents in the relevant time period).
182. See 42 U.S.C. § 603 (Supp. 111996).
183. See id. § 608(a)(7)(A).
184. See id. § 607(a).
185. See id. § 607(e)(1)(A).
186. See idL § 607(e)(1)(B). Persons on welfare receive at least a portion of their
welfare grant in cash. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.2(a) (1997)
(describing cash benefits); id. § 352.2(d) (1996) (listing cash benefit levels).
187. In an optional workfare program within the USDA, welfare recipients may
lose their food stamps through sanctions for noncompliance. See 7 U.S.C. § 2029(f)
(Supp. II 1996). Generally, when states calculate the credit they receive for the work
programs, they include Food Stamps in this calculation. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 22, § 4316-A(2) (West 1997) (stating that welfare workers must be paid the mini-
mum wage in net benefits); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 336 (McKinney Supp. 1998) (in-
cluding food stamps in the calculation of the workfare minimum wage). In addition, if
a person fails to comply with the work requirements, they may lose their Food Stamps
as well as their cash assistance. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(e).
188. Some states, including New York, give welfare recipients part of their grant in
the form of a shelter allowance, which is generally a payment sent directly to the
recipient's landlord to be credited against the recipient's rent. See N.Y. Comp. Codes
R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.3(a) (1996).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(1)(A)-(B) (providing that, for noncompliance, states
must either terminate assistance or reduce the amount of assistance "payable to the
family pro rata (or more, at the option of the State)"). Some states terminate assist-
ance until the recipient complies. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 414.065(4) (Vest 1998). A
recent New York proposal represents the farthest reaches of this discretionary power.
Taking sanctions to their most extreme conclusions, New York's Governor George
Pataki has suggested that if parents fail to comply wvith the work requirements, then
the entire family's cash benefits would be terminated over a three-month period. See
Raymond Hernandez, Pataki Urges New Sanctions for Workfare, N.Y. Times, Mar. 4,
1998, at B1. New York sanctions the parent for the first failure or refusal to comply.
See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 1300.12(d)(1) (1998).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(d). Specifically, work activities are:
(1) unsubsidized employment;
(2) subsidized private sector employment;
(3) subsidized public sector employment;
(4) work experience . . . if sufficient private sector employment is not
available;
(5) on-the-job training;
(6) job search and job readiness assistance;
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ployment experience, and community service. 91 The first twenty
hours worked during any week must fall into nine of the twelve listed
activities.' 92 The PRA does not require payment of the minimum
wage for work activities. 193 Nonetheless, most states mandate that
workfare workers be paid the minimum wage. 194 In addition, as a
general rule, states cap the maximum hours a welfare recipient may be
required to work at forty, mooting any application of the overtime
provisions of the FLSA to workers.'95
The PRA sets forth minimum levels of participation that states must
maintain among their welfare populations.196 Otherwise, states risk
losing a fraction of their funding for noncompliance. 97 The PRA cre-
ates two classifications of recipients: single-parent families and two-
parent families.' 98 Further, the PRA sets forth the minimum number
of hours that members of each class must work per week, and it re-
quires that a percentage of class members must comply with the mini-
mum hours requirement. 199 Among all families receiving aid under
the PRA, 25% must participate in work activities in 1997.20o The min-
imum participation rate increases by 5% every year until 2002;2o1 by
(7) community service programs;
(8) vocational educational training [12-month maximum];
(9) job skills training directly related to employment;
(10) education directly related to employment, in the case of a recipient
who has not received a high school diploma or a certificate of high school
equivalency;
(11) satisfactory attendance at secondary school or in a course of study lead-
ing to a certificate of general equivalence ... ; and
(12) provision of child care services to an individual who is participating in
community service program.
Id. § 607(d)(1)-(12).
191. See id.
192. See id. § 607(c)(1)(A). For two-parent families, the requirement is 35 hours.
See id. § 607(c)(1)(B).
193. The Family Support Act, however, had this requirement. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 682(O(B)(i) (1994) (repealed 1996).
194. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 414.065(1)(b) (West 1998) (guaranteeing workfare work-
ers the minimum wage); 305 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/6-1.7 (West 1998) (same); Ind.
Code Ann. § 12-20-11-1(c) (Michie 1997) (same); N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 336-c(2)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1998) (same). These statutes do not moot the minimum wage issue
because they calculate all benefits, not just cash assistance. See Ind. Code § 12-20-11-
1; N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 336-c(2)(b). Other states consider cash benefits only. See
Fla. Laws Stat. Ann. § 414.065; Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62, § 405.2(b) (West 1997).
Although state minimum wage laws provide some protection for welfare workers,
because states do not provide all of their benefits in cash it is unclear if compliance
with state law is equivalent to compliance with the FLSA.
195. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 414.065(2) (West 1998) (limiting hours per week to
40 under all circumstances).
196. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(a)(1)-(2) (Supp. 11 1996).
197. See id. § 609(a)(3)(A).
198. See id. § 607(a)(1) (one-parent families); id. § 607(a)(2) (two-parent families).
199. See id. § 607(a), (c)(1)(A).
200. See id. § 607(a)(1).
201. See id.
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that time, 50% of all families receiving aid must be engaged in work
activities.2"2 Among two-parent families, 75% must participate in
work activities in 1997 and 1998, and 90% must participate in 1999
and every year thereafter.20 3 In order to be counted under the
mandatory minimum participation rates, a single parent must work an
average of twenty hours per week in 1997 and 1998, twenty-five hours
per week in 1999, and thirty hours per week thereafter.2 1 Adults in
families with disabled parents or "severely disabled" children must
work a total of thirty-five hours per week; otherwise, the parents must
work a total of fifty-five hours per week.205
The PRA fundamentally changed the way the states administered
welfare.20 6 The PRA mandates that states move a percentage of their
welfare recipients into work activities.' 7 It also sets time limits on the
assistance an individual might receive, and mandates sanctions for
those who do not comply with their work requirements. 20s While
"work activities" include vocational training and education, the first
twenty hours of work per week must be work experience, community
service, or public or private employment.2 9
Although workfare has existed in different forms for decades, the
mandatory work requirements of the PRA created a new atmosphere,
if not a new hostility, towards welfare.210 Legally, the changes raise
questions about the relationship between welfare law, work require-
ments, and the strong American tradition of worker protection. The
PRA forces welfare recipients into the workforce. The next section
will examine what happens when workfare collides with the minimum
wage.
III. APPLICATION OF THE IN-KIND BENEFITs TEST TO
WORKFARE PARTICIPANTS
States have developed a variety of means of delivering welfare ben-
efits to their citizens.211 This section outlines the benefits welfare re-
cipients generally receive and applies the in-kind benefits tests
outlined in part I to welfare benefits. It concludes that welfare bene-
fits are not in-kind benefits that may be counted as wages.
202. See id.
203. See &L § 607(a)(2).
204. See id. § 607(c)(1)(A).
205. See id. § 607(c)(1)(B).
206. Many states had already enacted laws similar to the PRA pursuant to the
waiver provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (providing the Secretary of Health and Human
Services with the power to waive certain federal requirements in favor of state experi-
mental plans).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7)(A).
208. See id. § 607(e); supra note 183 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
210. See Diller, supra note 9, at 20.
211. See supra note 24.
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The following example illustrates how the wage credit operates in
the private sector and workfare. If a person works forty hours per
week at the rate of $5.15 per hour, 12 he earns $206.13 Assume,
though, that the employer provides the employee with one widget per
week that, although not cash, is fungible and benefits the employee.
Assume further that, although the market value of widgets is high, $60
per unit, the employer specializes in producing widgets, and can pro-
duce a high volume of widgets at low cost. Thus, the employer spends
only $1 to make every widget that she is giving to the employees. The
employer may credit the cost of providing the widget against the em-
ployees' wages, paying her only $205. Note, however, that only pay-
ment below the statutory minimum wage triggers the in-kind benefits
requirement.2 14 Suppose the employer in the example above paid her
employees $10 per hour, and deducted the $60 market value of the
widget from the employee's paycheck. This practice does not trigger
the statute because the employee's hourly wage is not less than the
minimum wage.2 15
Now assume that the employee is a welfare recipient who works
twenty hours every week in a work experience program. The em-
ployee must receive $103 per week in cash (twenty hours per week at
the minimum wage rate). If the employee's cash grant for that week is
less than $103, then the state is paying the employee in this example
less than the federal minimum wage and has violated the FLSA. 16
Many states are underpaying their workfare workers by more than
fifty percent. For example, a single person without children in New
York receives $112 of public assistance every month.2 17 New York's
welfare laws require that such person work at least twenty hours per
week during 1998.218 At $28 per week, the worker's wage is less than
$2 per hour. The state must cure the defect by either reducing the
number of hours the employee works, which would preclude that per-
son from being counted as a participant in a work program under the
PRA,21 9 increase cash assistance, or consider non-cash benefits as part
of that employee's wages.
While cash benefits are rarely sufficient to fulfill the state's obliga-
tion to pay workers the minimum wage,22" the sum total of a recipi-
212. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996).
213. These examples exclude any taxes, which the employer must pay on the em-
ployee's behalf. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.38 (1997).
214. See id. § 531.28.
215. See id.
216. See supra note 192 (discussing how many states mandate that workfare work-
ers be paid either the Federal or state minimum wage).
217. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.2, schedule SA-2a (1996).
218. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 335-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
219. See supra note 183.
220. The average monthly benefit in the states in 1995 was $377. See Staff of House
Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 21, at 386-87 tbl. 8-1.
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ent's benefits package may result in a wage which is equal to or
greater than the minimum wage. For example, utilizing the same wel-
fare recipient from the above example, if New York included food
stamps, the shelter allowance, and home energy supplement pay-
ments, a worker would earn over $5.15 per hour based on a twenty-
hour workweek." 1 The Department of Labor, however, has set down
regulations regarding what in-kind benefits are and when they may be
credited against a person's wage.'m In addition, case law has further
refined and, at times, muddled the definition.21-?
In order to determine whether employers may use non-cash bene-
fits to count toward their minimum wage payments in the context of
welfare, these benefits must be analyzed under formulae pronounced
by the DOL and applied by the courts. The next section performs this
analysis. First, the section describes non-cash benefits workfare recip-
ients usually receive. Second, the section asks whether the in-kind
benefits satisfy all of the requirements of the FLSA. The section con-
cludes that welfare benefits do not satisfy all of the requirements of
the FLSA, and that states generally may not credit non-cash benefits
against the cash wages states owe workfare workers.
A. What Are Non-Cash Welfare Benefits?
As discussed in part I, non-cash benefits that off-set cash wages
must be customarily furnished, the off-set must be the reasonable cost
of the benefit to the employer, and the benefits must be received vol-
untarily and in an uncoerced manner. 4 Benefits provided in the con-
text of workfare include food stamps,' childcaren 6 transporta-
tion,' 7 and housing subsidies " s
Food stamps are coupons that the state gives to persons who ex-
change them for food at participating stores.2 9 Food stamp budgets
are determined based upon a family's size, income, and expenses, such
as rent, heat, and school tuition.3 0 New York includes the amount of
food stamps a person receives in calculating the maximum hours that
221. See supra note 26.
222. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.27, .29 (1997).
223. See supra Part I.B.1.
224. See supra Part I.B.
225. See Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 21, at 856 tbl.16-3.
226. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 1300A(a)(1)(ii) (1998); cf 42
U.S.C. § 607(e)(2) (Supp. 111996) (stating that no state may reduce or terminate the
benefits of a person without childcare for a child under six years of age who refuses to
work).
227. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 12, § 1300A(b)(1) (1998).
228. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.3 (1997).
229. See 7 U.S.C. § 2012 (1994). For example, a person who receives S60 worth of
food stamps may purchase $60 worth of food. See id. § 2013.
230. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 387.9-10 (1996 & 1998) (list-
ing factors).
1998]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
recipients may work.2 31 Also, persons receiving only food stamps
must participate in work activities.2 32 Families receive food stamps
that bear dollar amounts. For example, a person who receives sixty
dollars of food stamps may purchase sixty dollars worth of food. The
dollar amount is counted as part of a worker's benefit, and, if the
worker is covered under the FLSA, is credited against wages.
The state must provide other benefits for workfare participants.
One such benefit is childcare.233 Parents must conduct a reasonable
search for childcare for children under six, and the state must provide
such childcare if the parents are unable to find it."M For example, in
Alaska, workfare workers do not have to participate in the program if
the state does not pay for their childcare.23s Workfare workers also
have the right to transportation to and from their work sites. 36 For
example, in New York, workers receive two tokens per day to com-
mute by subway or bus.2 37 Finally, housing subsidies are a substantial
portion of benefits. These are payments that pay for rent. 38 Some
states "direct vendor," or send to the landlord, part of the recipients'
welfare grant in the form of a housing subsidy. 39
B. Are States Entitled to Credit In-Kind Workfare Benefits Against
the FLSA Minimum Wage?
To qualify as wages under the FLSA, in-kind benefits must be (1)
customarily furnished, (2) set-off at the reasonable cost to the em-
ployer, and (3) voluntarily accepted without coercion.2 40 No cases
have addressed these standards in the context of workfare benefits,
but litigation on the basis of minimum wage violations has been sug-
gested. 41 In addition, the DOL and Department of Agriculture
("USDA") have attempted to provide some administrative guidance
231. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 336-c(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1998).
232. See id.
233. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2) (Supp. 111996) (creating an exception to termination
if a parent does not have childcare for a child under six years of age).
234. Cf id. (creating an exception to termination if a parent does not have child-
care for a child under six years of age).
235. See Alaska Stat. § 47.27.035(d)(1) (Michie 1996); N.Y. Comp. Codes R. &
Regs. tit. 12, § 1300.4(b)(2) (1998) (mandating that New York pay up to $200 in child-
care if the primary caregiver is the workfare worker).
236. See, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 332(2) (McKinney Supp. 1998) ("A local serv-
ices official shall: (a) make diligent efforts to assist a person who needs transportation
to get to and from a work activity site in obtaining such transportation . .
237. See id.
238. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.3 (1997).
239. See 45 C.F.R. § 234.60 (1997) (setting forth the requirements that states must
meet if they choose to make direct-vendor or two-party payments of benefits); N.Y.
Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352.3.
240. See supra notes 81-145 and accompanying text.
241. See Mary R. Mannix et al., Welfare Litigation Developments Since the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 31 Clearinghouse
Rev. 435, 444 (1998).
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on this issue.242 This part first looks at the DOL and USDA Guid-
ances, and then analyzes in-kind benefits under each element of the
test outlined above. 43
1. The DOL Guidance, the USDA Guidance, and State Laws that
Count Food Stamps as In-Kind Benefits
As a preliminary matter, the DOL has stated that the FLSA applies
to welfare workers.24 The DOL also briefly addressed food stamps
and other in-kind benefits, and stated, without much discussion or any
analysis, that "food stamp benefits ... may contribute towards meet-
ing minimum wage requirements for TANF recipients in work activi-
ties." '245 The guidance further muddied murky waters by additionally
stating "a participant who is employed by the state may receive food
stamps as compensation for certain hours and receive welfare benefits
as compensation for other hours of employment. '246 For the most
part, states can only meet minimum wage requirements by combining
food stamp benefits with TANF benefits. If food stamp benefits and
other welfare benefits may only count toward separate work hours,
then the states are still not paying their workers enough money. Re-
garding other benefits, the DOL iterated the elements of in-kind ben-
efits247 and concluded without analysis that "[b]ecause these criteria
are quite strict, it is likely that these benefits will not count as wages in
most circumstances. ' 24
Trailing on the coattails of the DOL guidance, the USDA declared
that states can combine food stamp benefits and TANF grants.2 49
Like the DOL's guidance, the USDA's guidance states this but does
not analyze food stamps. Indeed, because interpretation and enforce-
ment of the FLSA falls under the DOL rather than the USDA, 0 the
USDA's guidance reaches, at best, as far as the DOL statement, which
fails to analyze food stamps under the in-kind benefits test. Neither
the DOL or the USDA have taken the analytical steps necessary to
determine whether food stamps are in-kind benefits. Therefore,
although the DOL and USDA may have "solved" the problems this
Note discusses, the guidances are the beginning of the analysis, not the
end.
Likewise, state laws that merely assert that food stamps qualify as
wages are insufficient as well. Although several states have passed
laws that mandate that welfare workers must receive the minimum
242. See Department of Labor, supra note 12.
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. See Department of Labor, supra note 12.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. These elements are discussed fully in supra part I.B.
248. Department of Labor, supra note 12.
249. See id.
250. See id.
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wage,25' these laws often include food stamps in the minimum wage
calculation .1 2 This is problematic because these laws assume that in-
kind food stamp benefits count in the minimum-wage calculation, just
like the USDA's guidance did. This works if the FLSA does not apply
to workfare workers or, if it applies, then only if food stamp benefits
satisfy the "in-kind" benefits test. Indeed, if workfare workers are
covered, then, at the very least, the DOL or the states must at least
analyze whether food stamps are in-kind benefits that may off-set the
minimum wage. 3 This Note undertakes that analysis in the following
sections and concludes that food stamps and other benefits do not
meet FLSA criteria for in-kind wages.
2. The In-Kind Benefits Test in the Context of Workfare
This section conducts a careful analysis of whether in-kind benefits
are wages under the FLSA. The analysis fills the gap left by the DOL,
USDA, and state law in this area.
a. The Customarily Furnished Test
The first element of the test of whether in-kind benefits constitute
wages under the FLSA is whether the benefits are "customarily fur-
nished." The DOL has articulated that if the employer has regularly
provided the benefit, or if other similar employers have regularly pro-
vided it in similar situations, then the benefit is customary.254 No
court has analyzed workfare benefits under this formula.
One approach for states to consider is to examine the activity that
workfare participants are doing and the customs of that job or indus-
try to determine whether the benefits they are receiving are custom-
ary. States could compare the benefits that the workfare worker
received with those of a person who engages in that work outside of
the context of welfare. For example, if a welfare worker cleaned a
city's streets, the comparison would be to a sanitation worker who did
the same work. If a welfare worker performed clerical work in a gov-
ernment office, then the comparison would be to clerical workers.
The court should ask what benefits the private or public worker in the
equivalent job receives.
This is problematic, however, because most workfare jobs do not
traditionally or regularly confer in-kind benefits on employees. In-
251. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
252. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
253. The DOL has stated in its guidance that food stamps count, but did so without
engaging in an in-kinds benefits analysis. See Department of Labor, supra note 12.
Regarding benefits other than food stamps, the guidance merely states that,
"[b]ecause the[ minimum wage requirements] are quite strict, it is likely that these
benefits will not count as wages in most circumstances." Id. Finally, the guidance is
for "general information" only and does not have the effect of law. Id.
254. See 29 C.F.R. § 531.30 (1997).
[Vol. 67
WORKFARE WAGES UNDER THE FLSA
deed, work activity assignments tend to be to the Sanitation or Parks
Departments. 255 Not only do these jobs generally fail to provide hous-
ing (such as a motor lodge, inn, or housekeeping position might) or
food (such as a restaurant might), but whatever the employer custom-
arily provides the worker, such as tools or protective clothing, is for
the benefit of the employer. 6 Thus, these workfare workers do not
engage in the types of work that usually promise in-kind benefits. 257
An additional problem with this approach is that an analysis based
on the customs and practices of specific industries and jobs may be
unfair and offend equal protection principles. The guiding principle of
welfare payments is a person's needs and resources.258 A person's re-
sources determine eligibility, and the number of persons in a recipi-
ent's family determines the level of benefits." 9 If the form of the
benefits could be modified based on the type of workfare job assigned
by the state to a person, then public assistance recipients who are simi-
larly situated might be treated differently. 260
The fundamental difference between welfare benefits and benefits
that are customary is that there is no employee participation in the
creation of the customs of reimbursement. For example, in the restau-
rant and classical railroad industries, employees and employers had
informal and formal agreements about in-kind benefits.2 61 Welfare re-
cipients, on the other hand, have no such input. States may fashion
relief in any form they see fit. 262 At the same time, welfare recipients
are not in a position to bargain.26 3 Therefore, benefits are not issued
according to any custom, but are instead granted at the pleasure of the
state. Accordingly, states should not receive credit for those benefits.
A second approach to determining what benefits are customary is
to consider welfare itself as an industry or entity from which one may
255. See Diller, supra note 9, at 30-31; Gregory, supra note 12, at 14-15.
256. See supra note 99. Tools make employees more efficient. Safety equipment
protects employees, which in turn protects employers from liability. Thus, such items
are not for the benefit of the employee, but rather for the employer. See Southern
Pac. Co. v. Joint Council of Dining Car Employees, Locals 456 & 582, 165 F.2d 26, 29
(9th Cir. 1947) (stating that items used on the company's time are for the benefit of
the company).
257. See Diller, supra note 9, at 20 ("[V]ork programs are deliberately structured
so that they are virtually never comparable to holding an actual job.").
258. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 351.2 (1998).
259. See id.
260. Compare N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 351.2 (1998) (basing eligibil-
ity and benefits levels on household resources), with N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs.
tit. 12, § 1300.6(a) (1998) (stating that the state must consider a person's skills, prefer-
ences, and work experience in job placement).
261. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (describing the in-kind benefits
arrangement as part of the employer-employee contract); supra notes 104-05 (discuss-
ing the contract agreement porters arranged with railroad management concerning
meals).
262. See supra note 21.
263. See Handler, supra note 9, at 7.
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divine customs. This approach posits that the states' and federal gov-
ernment's administration of public assistance has developed its own
customs by which to judge workfare. There are identifiable trends
and developments in welfare law. For many years, AFDC tied the
reception of some benefits to other activities such as education or
work. 64 Further, under one program, some welfare recipients were
required to conduct job searches and register with their state for em-
ployment.265 But this requirement was not enforced, and usually the
"job search" ended with the registration. 66 Over time, additional and
more stringent requirements appeared. 67
Each new welfare law development, however, was the product of
legislation, not the creation of customs to meet new situations.2 68 If
welfare administrators developed customs outside of the authorization
of the relevant empowering legislation, then they would be acting be-
yond the scope of their power. In addition, the customs are being
developed in the context of workfare. Workfare employees hold their
jobs so they may learn job skills and be trained.2 69 The beneficiary of
the relationship is the worker, not the employer. The employer is also
supervising the workfare employees much more than its regular em-
ployees. The customs arise out of a compelled legal relationship, not
out of a contractual relationship.2 70 Thus, a court would not be able to
look to welfare for customs.
Further, the conditions imposed by the PRA are new to the welfare
state. The novel custom of exchanging benefits for work may not have
been in existence long enough to be regularly provided. 71 Also,
although the PRA sets goals for participation, not all welfare recipi-
ents are being required to work.2 72 Welfare recipients do not have the
same relationship with the states that employees have had with their
employers, thus making an analogy between the two very difficult.
Not only must in-kind benefits be customary in order to qualify as
wages under the FLSA, but they must also be "furnished." In order
for these benefits to be "furnished," they must be for the primary ben-
264. See Diller, supra note 9, at 20-23.
265. See Sanger, supra note 9, at 279.
266. See generally Diller, supra note 9, at 20-23 (discussing the limitations of earlier
workfare programs).
267. See id. (tracking the history of workfare).
268. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (Supp. 11 1996) (directing use of Federal
block grants).
269. See Gail P. Dave et al., Welfare Reform, 16 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 221, 262
(1997).
270. But cf supra notes 87-88, 104-05, and text accompanying note 261 (discussing
how employees traditionally had some input in compensation and benefits).
271. Cf Melton v. Round Table Restaurants, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 532, 534
(N.D. Ga. 1971) (discussing custom of providing meals as the standard for the
industry).
272. See 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2) (detailing workfare exceptions).
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efit of the employee, and not the employer .2 1 In the workfare con-
text, the employer is the state, and it is the state that may not directly
benefit from the acceptance of the benefits.
Recipients do enjoy the benefits of welfare. They purchase food
with food stamps. Should they receive child care, they can work while
a provider cares for young children. Housing subsidies are sent to
their landlords, and in return workfare workers have a place to live.
Thus, with the arguable exception of child care, workfare workers are
the primary beneficiaries of in-kind benefits. The state, on the other
hand, may receive the benefit of the work performed by welfare work-
ers. For example, a state benefits from welfare workers who clean
parks in work experience programs because the state receives cleaner
parks. Nevertheless, because the primary purpose of work experience
programs is to train welfare workers to perform employment-related
tasks,274 cleaner parks may be an "incidental benefit" from the work
program. 275 Therefore, workfare benefits may be considered "fur-
nished" under the FLSA.
b. The Reasonable Cost Credit
Even if workfare in-kind benefits are "customarily furnished,"
thereby satisfying the first element of the test, states may only credit
the reasonable cost or fair value of the benefits against the minimum
wage.276 The credit the state takes in these cases is generally the bot-
tom line value of the benefit to the welfare recipient .2 " For example,
if a person receives $60 in food stamps, the stamps have a value of $60
to the recipient, and the state credits $60 against the cash wage it pays
the workfare worker. Clearly, the state does not profit from this rela-
tionship; the employee spends the food stamps at a store, which is not
owned by the government. Likewise, the state does not profit when it
subsidizes rent, transportation, or other costs.
The credit must be the reasonable cost. Here, the government is
not the direct provider of benefits, but it uses proxies to provide bene-
273. See supra Part I.B.1.
274. See New York State Department of Labor, Notification of Work Required and
Right to Contest (computer-generated form) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(stating, to a work program participant, that "[a]s a person required to participate in
work activities, you are expected to meet one or more... [work] requirements. The
purpose of these requirements is to assist you in finding and keeping a job so that you
will no longer be in need of public assistance."). But cf. Diller, supra note 9, at 24
(arguing that states no longer must justify work programs on the basis of promoting
employability).
275. See Marshall v. Truman Arnold Distrib. Co., 640 F.2d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 1981);
supra note 111 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part I.B.2.
277. Cf. supra note 109 and accompanying text (discussing the wage credit that pri-
vate employers may take).
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fits.2 78 If the government provided the benefits directly, it would not
be able to reap a profit in terms of the credit it could take. Likewise,
where the government uses proxies to provide in-kind benefits, it is
not making a profit. Therefore, a credit matching what the govern-
ment spends would be reasonable.
c. Voluntary Acceptance
Finally, even if in-kind benefits are "customarily furnished" and are
credited at their reasonable cost or fair value, the benefits cannot be
wages under the FLSA unless employees accept them voluntarily.279
As discussed earlier, courts have not agreed on how to interpret this
requirement.28 ° The majority rule states that if a person chooses a job
knowing that some wages will be paid through benefits, then this
choice is considered voluntary.281 The minority view states that em-
ployees who may receive in-kind benefits must have the choice be-
tween those benefits and the cash.282 Thus, either employees must be
given the choice to receive their wages in cash, or employees must
freely choose their job with notice.
Under the majority's analysis, welfare benefits may be voluntary
and uncoerced.283 As a preliminary matter, persons who receive wel-
fare are presumed to be capable of participating in work activities.284
To receive welfare, a person must apply for it.285 Thereafter, the per-
son must be approved, 286 at which time the state will set benefit
levels.287 At some point in this process, a social services caseworker
will likely explains to the potential recipient the form that their bene-
fits will take.288 Those who apply for welfare know or have construc-
tive notice that the state may determine the means by which it delivers
benefits. 289 Therefore, the acceptance of these benefits is arguably
voluntary and uncoerced because recipients have the choice of receiv-
ing welfare, and implicitly consenting to the in-kind benefits, or choos-
ing not to receive welfare.
278. As discussed earlier, see supra Part II, the federal government gives the states
block grants, thus the states are proxies for the federal government. Because I as-
sume that the state is the employer, however, the proxies are the government agencies
or the private employers for whom welfare workers toil.
279. See supra Part I.B.
280. See supra Part I.B.
281. See supra Part I.B.3.
282. See supra Part I.B.3.
283. See supra Part I.B.3.
284. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 332.1 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
285. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 350 (1998) (application
process).
286. See, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 351.8 (1996) (eligibility
decision).
287. See generally, e.g., N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 352 (1997) (benefit
types and levels).
288. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 351.1(b) (1998).
289. See id.
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On the other hand, such applications may not be voluntary and un-
coerced. Recall Lopez2 90 where the court held that although a live-in
worker may have voluntarily and without coercion accepted the posi-
tion, the situation may have become coercive over time.291 Implicit in
the court's holding is that where a person accepts a job that provides
in-kind benefits in the form of food and housing, he or she may be-
come dependent on the food and housing to the degree that they must
withstand any new conditions or burdens placed upon them by the
employer because they have no choice.29 2 On this point, the D.C. Cir-
cuit remanded the issue for further fact-finding by the lower court.29
Along the same lines, a person who applies for welfare may not
have a choice because she does not have enough money to pay the
rent or buy food. Welfare usually forestalls hunger and eviction.
Once a person's application is approved, and she starts receiving ben-
efits, she is in the same position as the live-in household worker in
Lopez.2 94 She is dependent on the state for essential goods and serv-
ices such as food and housing, and she must bear whatever conditions
the provider may impose upon her. In the case of a person on wel-
fare, the fact that she will lose her benefits, and consequently her
housing, may be coercive. Therefore, it is not at all clear that the gov-
ernment "furnishes" workers their benefits involuntarily and without
coercion.
Employees, under the minority rule, must have a choice to accept
in-kind benefits.295 The state, however, gives workfare benefits on a
take-it-or-leave-it system.296 Although persons may choose which
benefits to accept and which to decline, the government never gives a
person the choice between cash and food stamps or other non-cash
benefits.2 97 In fact, the state exercises a great degree of control over
the benefits it administers. A welfare recipient may never see her
housing subsidies; payments are sent to the landlord directly if the
recipient has at some time failed to apply her shelter allowances to the
rent.298 Food stamps restrict the places where persons may buy food
because not all stores accept food stamps. Similarly, not all doctors
accept Medicaid. These benefits are not fungible, and they are used to
obtain designated services rather than purchase freely-chosen goods
290. Lopez v. Rodriguez, 668 F.2d 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
291. See id. at 1380.
292. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 136.
294. See supra note 136.
295. See supra Part I.B.3.
296. Cf N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, §§ 350-352 (1996, 1997, & 1998)
(providing for application and acceptance process).
297. See Patricia Collins Murdoch & Deborah Lee Stein, Protecting the Safety Net:
Food Stamp Benefits and the Waiver Process, 30 Clearinghouse Rev. 367, 384-85
(1996) (discussing the optional cash for food stamps program).
298. See N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. tit. 18, § 381.3(d) (1998).
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and services. Therefore, under the minority rule, benefits would not
be voluntary and uncoerced.
The measures of the PRA are unprecedented. Likewise, its passage
created unprecedented problems. Congress, whether through over-
sight or intent, did not provide for wage protection for welfare work-
ers. States have attempted to fill the gap by guaranteeing welfare
workers the minimum wage.299 Yet cash benefits alone are usually not
sufficient to guarantee that welfare workers receive the minimum
wage. Further, as the above analysis illustrates, it is highly unlikely
that workfare's non-cash benefits can qualify as wages under the
FLSA, because they do not appear to satisfy all of the prongs of the
FLSA's in-kind benefits test. States, therefore, must re-work their
benefits programs to avoid liability in FLSA actions. Part IV dis-
cusses the ways states can change their welfare programs to comply
with the FLSA.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Congress, through the FLSA, developed an intricate web of laws
and regulations that guarantee a minimum standard of income for
working people. The PRA, the legislative fruit of a younger tree,
redefined welfare by attaching work requirements to welfare pay-
ments.3 °° Consequently, the PRA and the FLSA collided.
As discussed above, courts have developed ways of analyzing FLSA
issues that suggest that states are not currently complying with the
FLSA in administering their workfare programs.3 0 1 Nevertheless,
workfare is the square peg that courts must insert into the judicial
round hole. Particularly in light of the differences in FLSA interpreta-
tion expressed in the federal courts,3 2 workfare-FLSA litigation will
tread an uncertain path.
There are several ways for states to cure the defects in their welfare
programs. First, states may petition Congress to revitalize the recent
GOP initiative to exempt workfare employees from federal employ-
ment law coverage. Secondly, states may attempt to tailor their wel-
fare programs to meet the trainee exceptions of the FLSA. Third,
states may attempt to meet their minimum wage obligations by re-
structuring in-kind benefits. The following sections discuses these
recommendations.
A. Create an Exemption
Although Congress implicitly accepted the DOL's determination
that federal wage and employment laws apply to workfare employees,
299. See supra note 194.
300. See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (Supp. II 1996).
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. See supra Part I.B.3.
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governors had expressed much concern that their states would not be
able to bear the expense of paying workfare workers the minimum
wage.30 3 The governors were strong supporters of the Republican at-
tempt to exempt workfare workers from the FLSA's minimum wage
requirement.3 4
Nothing rules out another attempt. Republican leaders promised
that the compromise that swept a workfare exemption off of the table
would be replaced with another one. 05 The FLSA is based upon pol-
icy considerations and measured judgments.3 16 As stated above, the
policy supporting the minimum wage and mandatory overtime laws is
strong but not paramount. 07 Politicians may now decide that the na-
tion's needs are best served by exempting workfare from the FLSA.
FLSA exemptions, however, have been criticized as discriminatory
in the past.30 8 Workfare participants have low levels of education,
and, for example, in cities, tend to be minorities. 3°  A congressional
exemption for the FLSA may be subject to criticism on the same
grounds. In addition, an exemption would cover millions of people,
based on the number of persons who receive welfare. Exempting as
many as eight million people who have no other federal wage protec-
tion seems to defeat the purposes of the FLSA.3 10 In addition, this
creates a pool of sub-minimum wage labor that can compete with
higher-paid wage earners.311 Nevertheless, Congress is free to exempt
workfare participants from FLSA coverage, which would alleviate the
conflict between the FLSA and the PRA.
B. States Should Certify Welfare Workers as Sub-minimum Wage
Students and Apprentices
This Note has discussed the ways in which the PRA and FLSA con-
flict with one another and press contrasting policy choices. Work-
303. See Robert Pear, G.O.P. in House Moves to Bar Mininum Wage for Workfare,
N.Y. Tumes, June 12, 1997, at B16.
304. See Robert Pear, Republican Leaders Exempt 'Workfare' Front Labor Laws,
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1997, at A7.
305. See Richard L. Berke, Gingrich Promises to Fight Clinton on Welfare Law,
N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1997, at Al.
306. See supra Part I.
307. See supra Part I.C.
308. See supra note 160.
309. See Jason DeParle, Shrinking Welfare Rolls Leave Record High Share of Mi-
norities, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1998, at Al.
310. See Administration for Children and Families, supra note 9 (stating that ap-
proximately eight million people receive welfare); supra Part I (discussing the goals of
the FLSA).
311. Cf. Brukhman v. Giuliani, 662 N.Y.S.2d 914, 920 (Sup. Ct. 1997) (holding, on
state law grounds, that welfare workers had to be paid the higher prevailing wage for
work performed, not the minimum wage), rev'd, 1998 WL 635655, at *1 (N.Y. App.
Div. Sept. 17, 1998) (mem.); Enzian v. Wing, 670 N.Y.S.2d 283, 284-85 (App. Div.
1998) (mem.) (citing the New York Supreme Court's ruling in Brukhman prior to its
reversal).
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training and vocational education count towards work activities. 312
The FLSA's reduced-minimum wage training exception is an area
where the FLSA and PRA complement one another.
States could create job-training programs or place workfare recipi-
ents into such programs. First, the lower minimum wage requirement
would give the states more breathing room to meet the federal wage
standard. Second, as a matter of policy, many workfare workers are
undertrained for private-sector jobs and require training.31 3 The
training would better prepare them for the jobs they must accept.
Third, training can be an excellent transition from idleness to
productivity.
Specifically, the FLSA contains minimum-wage exceptions for stu-
dent learners and apprentices.314 Two acceptable work activities
under the PRA are on-the-job training and vocational educational
training.315 States could place workfare workers in job training or ed-
ucation settings that meet the FLSA's requirements and fulfill the
state's obligations under the PRA. This solution, however, requires
the employer to meet certain conditions,316 and any expenses associ-
ated with meeting these conditions may off-set the minimum-wage
savings. Additionally, people cannot train or attend vocational school
indefinitely. Finally, these exceptions merely lower the minimum
wage requirement by 15-25%; states would still have to pay 75-85% of
the minimum wage.317 Thus, this solution has its limitations.
Here, Congress's policy choices meet, albeit at an unlikely place.
On the one hand, an earlier Congress guaranteed workers a cash
wage. Today's Congress reflects changing attitudes and norms about
welfare by mandating work activities in exchange for benefits. This
elevated the state's expectations of welfare recipients, but it concomi-
tantly triggered the greater protections the state affords working peo-
ple. States should utilize this opportunity to harmonize federal
welfare and labor law regulation.
C. Restructure In-Kind Benefits to Meet FLSA Criteria
The DOL has suggested that states could tailor food stamp pro-
grams to meet the DOL's in-kind benefits test.31 8 Indeed, the USDA
issued a guidance at the same time as the DOL's guidance that touted
the USDA's food-stamp workfare program as the solution to the mini-
mum wage problem. 319 This is significant because, for the most part,
312. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 309.
314. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
315. See supra note 190.
316. For these conditions, see supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text.
317. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
318. See Department of Labor, supra note 12; Diller, supra note 9, at 27 n.114.
319. See Department of Labor, supra note 12.
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the two largest components of a welfare recipient's benefits package
are cash benefits and food stamps.3 20 In fact, most of the households
that received AFDC in 1995 also received Food Stamps. 321
One way in which states could satisfy the DOL's in-kind benefits
test would be follow the DOL suggestion that states utilize the
USDA's Food Stamp Workfare program. 32 The USDA's program is
a workfare program similar to the PRA,3 1 which mandates that per-
sons who receive food stamps have the value of those food stamps
count as wages, or that employers receive the value of food stamps in
cash, which the employers must pay to the welfare workers.324
USDA's program potentially solves the workfare wages dilemma, be-
cause the hours that workfare workers toil count for the PRA and
USDA workfare requirements. 32  As discussed above, however, the
statements of the DOL and USDA in this regard are merely con-
clusory, and food stamps as currently constituted do not meet the
FLSA criteria for in-kind wages."2
States could circumvent the problem by converting food stamp ben-
efits into cash.327 Statutes authorize states to devise alternative plans
that cash-out food stamp benefits, and states have attempted this.3 1
Although cashing-out food stamps has been criticized because it po-
tentially diverts money that would have been spent on food to other
expenditures, it solves part of the FLSA dilemma. The welfare
worker looks more like an employee, and the cash option puts the
welfare worker in the same position as other employees. Indeed,
cashing-out food stamp benefits gives welfare recipients the indepen-
dence and ability to make their own economic choices. 329
320. See Staff of House Comm. on Ways and Means, supra note 21, at 437-38.
321. See id. at 856 tbl.16-3.
322. See 7 U.S.C. § 2029 (1994); Department of Labor, supra note 12.
323. See Department of Labor, supra note 12.
324. See id
325. See id
326. See supra Part III.
327. See Murdoch & Stein, supra note 297, at 384.
328. See id.
329. Rent subsidies also may fit into the circular in-kind benefits hole. See supra
note 245. The subsidies are like food stamp coupons: recipients can shop wherever
they want, within limits. These limits are at times illegally low. See Jiggetts v. Dowling,
609 N.Y.S.2d 222 (App. Div. 1994) (affirming preliminary injunction ordering Com-
missioner of Social Services to pay rent arrears to welfare recipient's landlord because
the shelter allowances were inadequate). In this case, recipients may use their subsi-
dies to live in their particular apartment. Recipients choose where to live, and the
government sends the rent directly to the landlord. Direct-vendor payments are
made when the agency that administers benefits determines that the recipient is not
sufficiently responsible to handle the money. See supra 239. The DOL guidance, how-
ever, only references cash benefits. See Department of Labor, supra note 12. The
Guidance does not discuss in-kind benefits. Thus, states should convert all of their
benefits to cash.
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CONCLUSION
For good or ill, welfare has changed. Persons who do not work for
their benefits do not receive them. This policy choice has collided
with another policy choice: persons who work must be paid according
to the standards defined by the FLSA. Workfare is, however, suffi-
ciently different from ordinary work such that analysis of workfare is
difficult under existing law. Thus, courts may make their own, new
law, or states may attempt to modify their welfare programs to con-
form to the requirements of the FLSA. Either way, important ques-
tions remain to be answered.
Before those answers arrive, however, the states must distribute
welfare benefits in an environment that is regulated by the PRA and
FLSA. Although much of this Note discusses how these Acts are dif-
ferent, there is overlap, such as the sub-minimum wage training provi-
sions."' Until Congress formulates a policy that unifies the goals of
the PRA and the FLSA, states must use this overlap to serve the in-
terests of welfare recipients while remaining true to federal
regulations.
330. Additionally, states always have the option, however distasteful, of increasing
cash benefits.
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